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Introduction 
In this year of ambitious new trade agreements, 1 public attention has 
turned once again to the relationship between the U.S. constitutional order 
and global commerce.2 Though they may seem strictly contemporary 
phenomena, neither "globalization" nor the many debates about it are new.3 
Indeed, they were present in a strikingly similar form in the founding era. 4 
One of the many ways in which the Founders' Constitution differs 
from current constitutional practice is in the arena of international trade. 
The changing conception of the constitutional status of international trade 
tracks the changing place of the American republic in the world of 
commerce. It also reveals the international dimension of what Fishkin and 
Forbath describe as "constitutional political economy," both in the founding 
era and today. 5 
* J.D., Yale Law School 2016. 
** Professor of Law, Yale Law School. The authors wish to thank the following people for 
their helpful comments and criticisms: Bruce Ackerman, Jack Balkin, Oona Hathaway, Margot 
Kaminski, Amy Kapczynski, Jeremy Kessler, Jedediah Purdy, and the participants at the 
conference The Constitution and Economic Inequality at the University of Texas School of Law, 
especially Joseph Fishkin and William Forbath, and at the Money, Numbers and Power workshop 
at Columbia University, especially Richard John, Nicholas Mulder and Adam Tooze. They also 
gratefully acknowledge the excellent assistance of the editors of the Texas Law Review. All errors 
remain theirs. 
I. See, e.g., Roberta Rampton, Exclusive: Obama Committed to Pacific Trade Deal, Even as 
Opposition Spreads - Rice, REUTERS (Mar. 9, 2016, 4:43 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-
usa-trade-exclusive-idUSKCNOWB2R2 [https://perma.cc/HV6X-AJW A] (observing President 
Obama's commitment to Trans-Pacific Partnership); Jennifer Rankin, TTIP: EU and US Vow to 
Speed Up Talks on Trade Deal, GUARDIAN (Feb. 6, 2016, 1:49 PM), http:// 
www.theguardian.com/business/2016/feb/26/ttip-eu-and-us-vow-to-speed-up-talks-on-trade-deal 
[https://perma.cc/N278-MLC4] (reporting that European and U.S. negotiators are "racing to strike 
a deal" over the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership before President Obama leaves 
office). 
2. See John Brinkley, Why Is Trade Such a Big Deal in The Election Campaign?, FORBES 
(Mar. 3, 2016, I 0: 19 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/johnbrinkley/2016/03/03/why-is-trade 
-such-a-big-deal-in-the-election-campaign/#54049d63585a [http://perma.cc/6QLJ-5ZLH] 
(observing that international trade has become a central issue in the U.S. presidential election). 
3. Emma Rothschild, Globalization and the Return of History, FOREIGN POL'Y, Summer 
1999, at 106, 107 (documenting the long history of globalization over several centuries). 
4. See infra text accompanying notes 53-76, 116-28. 
5. JOSEPH R. FISHKIN & WILLIAM E. FORBATH, THE ANTI-OLIGARCHY CONSTITUTION 
(forthcoming 2017) (manuscript at 1) (on file with the Texas Law Review); see also Joseph 
Fishkin & William E. Forbath, The Anti-Oligarchy Constitution, 94 B.U. L. REV. 669, 671 (2014) 
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Nowhere is this change more obvious than in the different procedures 
by which the United States now commits itself to foreign commercial 
relations, compared to the process during the Founding Era and for a 
century or more afterward. As several scholars have noted, the decisive 
shift occurred during the interwar period and in the immediate aftermath of 
the Second World War, when international commercial agreements 
formerly passed as treaties following the specification in Article II were 
repackaged as normal legislation, now passed under Article I. 6 
The "old" Article II route for the passage of treaties is clearly specified 
in the Constitution and was solidly established in practice up to the 1930s.7 
The Treaty Clause provides that the President "shall have the Power, by and 
with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties, provided two 
thirds of the Senators present concur."8 Up through the mid-twentieth 
century, nearly all international commercial agreements-and most 
international agreements generally-were passed as treaties using this 
mechanism.9 But today, almost no international trade agreements are 
ratified by a two-thirds supermajority of the Senate-and certainly no 
significant ones. 10 Instead, they are passed as so-called "congressional-
executive" agreements, using the route for normal statutes approved by a 
majority in both houses of Congress and signed into law by the President, 
as specified in Article I. 11 
Furthermore, despite being passed under Article I, the congressional-
executive agreements governing international trade are not ratified using 
normal Congressional rules. Instead, they are "fast tracked": passed by the 
House and Senate without the possibility of amendment or filibuster and 
under strict time deadlines. For instance, if the controversial Trans-Pacific 
Partnership (TPP) is ratified under this presidential administration or the 
next, it will be done through an "implementing statute," adopted within 
(introducing the characteristic forms of arguments about constitutional political economy). 
6. See, e.g., Bruce Ackerman & David Golove, Is NAFTA Constitutional?, 108 HARV. L. 
REV. 799, 845, 853-56 (1995) (analyzing the New Deal Era scholarship and jurisprudence that 
justified the use of postwar congressional-executive agreements); Oona A. Hathaway, Treaties' 
End: The Past, Present, and Future of International Lawmaking in the United States, 117 YALE 
L.J. 1236, 1300---06 (2008) (describing the center of gravity of U.S. international lawmaking 
shifting from treaties to ex post congressional-executive agreements). 
7. Hathaway, supra note 6, at 1274-86. 
8. U.S. CONST. art. II § 2, cl. 2. 
9. Hathaway, supra note 6, at 1292 ("[T]here is little evidence during this period [through the 
end of the Civil War] of congressional-executive agreements regarding international trade."). In 
the later nineteenth century, there were congressional-executive agreements related to embargos 
and, in the 1890s, a precursor to the later Reciprocal Tariffs Agreement Act of 1934, the 
McKinley Tariff Act of 1890, that allowed the President to negotiate reciprocal agreements with 
foreign nations without congressional approval. Id. at 1293-94. 
10. Exceptions include some extradition and taxation treaties. See infra note 26. 
11. For a discussion of the evolution of congressional-executive agreements, see generally 
Hathaway, supra note 6. 
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ninety days of the President's proposal of the text and with serious limits on 
the usual deliberative functions of Congress. 12 And, unlike the treaties of 
the Founding Era, which unambiguously concerned foreign relations, the 
TPP will reshape the domestic regulatory regime in areas including 
intellectual property, environmental regulation, and consumer protection, in 
conjunction with similar changes in the domestic regimes of our trading 
partners. 13 
Much indeed has changed since the Treaty Clause was written. Ex 
post congressional-executive agreements and fast track have become the 
dominant means of governing trade, and are understood to have ushered in 
a new global era. 14 The shift from the Article II to the Article I route for 
international lawmaking via congressional-executive agreements is credited 
with enabling a dramatic expansion in international commercial 
agreements, a linchpin (along with U.S. military expansion overseas) of the 
postwar world. 15 The anxiety that led Jefferson to admonish his 
countrymen to pursue "peace, commerce, and honest friendship with all 
nations" but "entangling alliances with none" has all but vanished from the 
current American republic. 16 
This change in the governance of trade has occasioned debate among 
constitutional scholars and jurists since it first occurred, and the controversy 
is renewed with each new episode of accelerated international integration. 
In the immediate postwar period, the shift from Article II to Article I was 
widely commented upon-both lauded and criticized by jurists and legal 
scholars. 17 The controversy reignited in the early 1970s with the passage of 
fast-track legislation, 18 and erupted again around the time of the emergence 
12. IAN F. FERGUSSON, CONG. RES. SERV., TRADE PROMOTION AUTHORITY (TPA) AND THE 
ROLE OF CONGRESS IN TRADE POLICY 10-11 (2015). 
13. David Grewal, Opinion, The President Wants to 'Fast Track' Two Massive Trade Deals. 
Congress Should Slow Him Down, L.A. TIMES (Mar. 29, 2015, 9:48 PM), 
http://www.latimes.com/opinion/op-ed/la-oe-grewal-congress-should-not-okay-fast-track 
-20150327-story.htrnl [https://perma.cc/ A8ET-QCN2]. 
14. Hathaway, supra note 6, at 1258-72, 1304--06. 
15. See generally Ackerman & Golove, supra note 6. 
16. Thomas Jefferson, President of the United States, First Inaugural Address (Mar. 4, 1801), 
http://avalon.law.yale.edu/ 19th_ century/ jefinau I .asp [https://perma.cc/L5AG-9NZA ]. 
17. For favorable commentary on the rise of congressional-executive agreements, see 
Myres S. McDougal & Asher Lans, Treaties and Congressional-Executive or Presidential 
Agreements: Interchangeable Instruments of National Policy: I, 54 YALE L.J. 181, 203--06 (1945). 
For a contrary view, see generally Edwin M. Borchard, American Government and Politics: 
Treaties and Executive Agreements, 40 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 729 (1946). For a recent discussion of 
these sources, see Hathaway, supra note 6, at 1244-47. 
18. Concerns at that time foreshadowed present debates about trade agreements dominating 
domestic regulation. See, e.g., The Trade Reform Act of 1973: Hearings on H.R. 6767 Before the 
H. Comm. on Ways and Means, 93d Cong. 394 (1975) (statement of William R. Pearce, 
Ambassador, Deputy Special Representative for Trade Negotiations) ("We can't ask you for an 
advance grant of authority to do away with [non-tariff barriers]; in most cases they are linked in 
very subtle ways to all sorts of domestic legislation."). 
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of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and the World 
Trade Organization (WTO) in the mid-1990s. 19 Our return to these debates 
today is occasioned not only by the fact that the United States is once again 
at a turning point in its international commercial ambitions-with several 
massive new trade deals now looming-but also because the procedures by 
which these trade deals have been promulgated have evolved even since the 
debates occasioned by NAFTA and the WTO. 
In this Essay, we contrast the prevailing views about trade and treaty 
making with the anxieties about foreign entanglement felt during the 
Founding Era. We explore these contrasts by examining the evolution of 
three justifications for the modem trade regime, which we consider to 
include both Article I lawmaking and "fast-track" procedures (now called 
"trade promotion authority"). Specifically, the use of these new procedures 
to establish U.S. foreign commitments has been justified by: (1) the need 
for U.S. participation and, ultimately, leadership in the international order; 
(2) the need to maintain executive flexibility and credibility in international 
negotiation in order to secure such leadership; and (3) the need to 
harmonize domestic regulatory regimes across national borders in an era of 
globalization. Each of these justifications may be illuminated by 
comparison with debates on trade during America's founding period. 
We argue that these justifications largely reflect an underlying 
motivation comparable to that of the Founders: the desire to protect 
American political autonomy. But one of the Founders' major concerns has 
been left behind, namely that one region's economic interests and 
institutions should not be aggressively undercut in promoting the interests 
of another. The disappearance of this concern coincides with the rise of 
congressional-executive agreements, fast track, and an international 
economic policy that initially favored industrial capital over agrarian 
interests and now privileges the finance and technology sectors on the East 
and West Coasts above the decaying industrial heartland.20 These 
developments also mark the transition from a foreign policy motivated by 
resistance to European imperialism to one driven by what is usually called 
"American global leadership."21 Recovering what Fishkin and Forbath call 
19. Compare Ackerman & Golove, supra note 6, at 802-03 (lauding the shift from Article II 
to Article I in the context ofNAFTA and the WTO), with Laurence H. Tribe, Taking Text and 
Structure Seriously: Reflections on Free-Form Method in Constitutional Interpretation, 108 
HARV. L. REV. 1221, 1227-28 (1995) (criticizing the shift). 
20. See discussion infra pp. 151-56. 
21. Josh Rogin, Clinton Pledges Another Century of American Global Leadership, FOREIGN 
POL'Y (Sept. 8, 2010, 9:21 AM), http://foreignpolicy.com/2010/09/08/clinton-pledges-another-
century-of-american-global-leadership [https://perma.cc/892H-R9YH] (quoting then-Secretary of 
State Hillary Clinton in 2010: "For the United States, global leadership is both a responsibility and 
an unparalleled opportunity"). 
2016] Two Views of International Trade 1499 
the "constitution of opportunity"22 will require exarrunmg how these 
changes, taken together, have affected the capacity for self-government in 
the American republic. 
I. Interchangeability and America's Role in the International Order 
The most obvious justification for the twentieth-century innovations in 
trade procedures is that congressional-executive agreements and fast track 
have allowed the United States to take a leadership position in shaping the 
international economic order. Taken jointly, these innovations are said to 
create a more efficient process for international lawmaking, less subject to 
interest group politics and legislative logrolling.23 The new procedures 
have allowed the federal government to advance a unified agenda for 
international trade with less risk of its being hijacked by particular (i.e., 
sectional or minority) interests. 
As noted in the Introduction, the modem trade regime is based on a 
shift in international lawmaking from Article II treaties to Article I 
legislation, passed as congressional-executive agreements. 24 In trade law, 
the shift began with the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act of 1934 
(RTAA), passed as an "ex ante authorization" by which both houses of 
Congress, using normal procedures, delegated negotiating power to 
President Roosevelt to pursue tariff reduction within preapproved ranges.25 
The use of an ex ante congressional-executive agreement was not 
unprecedented in the trade regime: Congress had earlier cooperated with 
President McKinley in the management of foreign trade relations, which the 
Supreme Court reviewed in Field v. Clark.26 But another form of Article I 
legislation-which Ackerman and Golove term an "ex post approval"27-
was first used in international economic governance about a decade later, in 
1945, when the Truman Administration presented an agreement providing 
for American participation in the Bretton Woods institutions for ratification 
22. FISHKIN & FORBATH, supra note 5 (manuscript at 1). 
23. See Oona A. Hathaway, Presidential Power over International Law: Restoring the 
Balance, 119 YALE L.J. 140, 263-66 (2009) (describing the advantages of the fast-track procedure 
and arguing for its expansion beyond trade); Hathaway, supra note 6, at 1307-38 (describing 
reasons for preferring a congressional-executive agreement even if a treaty might have 
traditionally been used); Harold Hongju Koh, The Fast Track and United States Trade Policy, 18 
BROOK. J. INT'L L. 143, 148 (1992) (describing the four policy ends served by the fast-track 
procedure). 
24. Hathaway, supra note 6, at 1286-1301. 
25. See Ackerman & Golove, supra note 6, at 824, 847-51 (defining "ex ante authorizations" 
as congressional-executive agreements that occur when Congress explicitly authorizes the 
Executive to make agreements under specified circumstances, using the Reciprocal Trade 
Agreements Act of 1934 as an example). 
26. 43 U.S. 649 (1892); Hathaway, supra note 6, at 1292-97. 
27. See Ackerman & Golove, supra note 6, at 827 (defining ex post approvals as 
congressional-executive agreements in which Congress approves a deal that the Executive has 
already worked out). 
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by both houses of Congress. 28 During the interwar era, ex post 
congressional-executive agreements had been used to establish American 
membership in several international organizations,29 and the 1945 Bretton 
Woods legislation set the pattern for postwar economic agreements 
generally.30 
The move away from Article II treaty making to congressional-
executive agreements was driven by a deepening sense that the Senate's 
control over foreign relations had led to disaster: first in its failure to ratify 
the Versailles Treaty in 1919 and then in the passage of the Smoot-Hawley 
tariffs of 1930.31 America's absence from the League of Nations and its 
interwar trade protectionism were believed to have contributed to the rise of 
fascism and, therefore, endangered the project of American 
constitutionalism itself. 32 Likewise, the RT AA represented the Democratic 
response to the Smoot-Hawley tariffs of 1930.33 Those high tariffs were 
widely believed to be the product of congressional logrolling, influenced 
especially by the agricultural sector, which had been devastated by falling 
commodity prices even before the stock market crash of 1929.34 Seeking to 
limit the influence of these "special interests," Congress delegated 
negotiating power to the President. 35 
In the aftermath of the Second World War, the United States was 
drawn into a new position of leadership on the global stage, working to 
rebuild a devastated Europe and solidifying the Western Bloc during the 
Cold War. It was clear to many American statesmen and jurists that this 
new role would depend upon a new international lawmaking process, less 
susceptible to hijacking by interest-group politics and the obstacle of a two-
thirds majority approval in the Senate.36 The new process would be 
required above all for international economic agreements, given their 
28. Id. at 891. 
29. Hathaway, supra note 6, at 1300. 
30. See Ackennan & Golove, supra note 6, at 891-93 (describing how the Senate's reaction 
to Bretton Woods led to a new, expanded precedent of congressional-executive agreements). 
31. See l.M. DESTLER, AMERICAN TRADE POLITICS 11-12 (4th ed. 2005) (emphasizing the 
dramatic drop in imports and exports resulting from the passage of the Smoot-Hawley tariffs); 
Ackennan & Golove, supra note 6, at 874 (describing the need for the United States to create a 
"more internationalist alternative to the classical procedure that had brought about the tragedy of 
Versailles"). 
32. See Ackennan & Golove, supra note 6, at 861--62 (describing how the Constitution and 
the Senate "set the stage for the rise of Hitler and the resumption of world carnage"). 
33. Douglas A. Irwin, From Smoot-Hawley to Reciprocal Trade Agreements: Changing the 
Course of U.S. Trade Policy in the 1930s, in THE DEFINING MOMENT: THE GREAT DEPRESSION 
AND THE AMERICAN ECONOMY IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 325, 325 (Michael D. Bordo et al. 
eds., 1998). 
34. Id. at 333-35. 
35. DESTLER, supra note 31, at 14-16. 
36. See, e.g., id. at 14-17 (describing bargaining between the Executive and Legislative 
Branches to overcome postwar obstacles to tariff setting). 
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outsized domestic impact: consider that Roosevelt used the Article II treaty 
route for American membership in the United Nations, trusting the Senate 
not to make the same mistake as it had with the League, but the Truman 
Administration used a congressional-executive agreement to establish 
American membership in the Bretton Woods institutions.37 
The shift to congressional-executive agreements for the governance of 
trade was justified as a triumph over Senate obstructionism enabled by the 
Treaty Clause. President Roosevelt justified the RTAA using inward-
looking arguments: "If the American government is not in a position to 
make fair offers for fair opportunities, its trade will be superseded."38 The 
globalization of the market meant that American control over its own 
economic policy required a more efficient international lawmaking process. 
Faster, less deliberative trade policy was justified by the need to sustain 
American interests abroad-and ultimately, American autonomy-in a 
globalized economy. And this greater efficiency was in turn justified by 
denigrating some interests as "special" and therefore less worthy of proper 
legislative consideration and the familiar protections available through 
congressional deliberation. While the much-discussed rise of executive 
power in the twentieth century has often been characterized as a response to 
geopolitical and military exigencies, the same arguments were used in the 
interwar period and afterward to justify an executive-driven management of 
foreign commercial relations.39 Indeed, Roosevelt pioneered this approach 
by somewhat tenuously relying on the Gold Reserve Act of 1934 to enter 
into currency-stabilization agreements with other nations through an 
exclusively executive agreement that bypassed Congress altogether.40 
A more dramatic example of this shift came a decade later with the rise 
of the ex post congressional-executive agreement as the main mechanism 
for passing international trade deals.41 The ex post congressional-executive 
agreement is now the standard way to ratify a wide array of international 
compacts, having generally eclipsed the use of the Treaty Clause except in a 
37. Ackerman & Golove, supra note 6, at 891. 
38. Id. at 847. 
39. See, e.g., BRUCE ACKERMAN, THE DECLINE AND FALL OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 31-
41 (2010) (describing the transformation of the Presidency into a "twenty-first-century 
demagogue, asserting extraconstitutional authority to master the latest crisis threatening the 
Republic"). See generally ARTHUR M. SCHLESINGER, JR., THE IMPERIAL PRESIDENCY (1973) 
(outlining the growth of presidential power over the history of the United States). 
40. GLENS. KRUTZ & JEFFREYS. PEAKE, TREATY POLITICS AND THE RISE OF EXECUTIVE 
AGREEMENTS: INTERNATIONAL COMMITMENTS IN A SYSTEM OF SHARED POWERS 39 (2009). 
These agreements, sometimes called "sole executive agreements," are used when the President 
engages with foreign governments pursuant to commitments ostensibly within the sole discretion 
of the Executive Branch. See generally David H. Moore, The President's Unconstitutional 
Treatymaking, 59 UCLA L. REV. 598 (2011) (describing and critiquing the practice of sole 
executive agreements). 
41. Hathaway, supra note 6, at 1298-1301. 
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few areas.42 Although the Supreme Court has never taken up the 
constitutionality of this mechanism,43 between 1946 and 1972, 88% of 
international agreements took this form. 44 By comparison, only twenty-
seven international compacts in the early founding period were concluded 
without a treaty,45 and these took the form of congressional-executive 
agreements regulating, for instance, the Postmaster General's ability to 
receive and deliver letters from foreign postal services.46 And whereas the 
early Republic's most significant international compacts, such as the Jay 
Treaty and the Louisiana Purchase, were ratified as Article II treaties, the 
most significant recent ones, such as those creating NAFTA and the WTO, 
were passed as congressional-executive agreements under Article 1.47 
The rise of the ex post congressional-executive agreement was directly 
tied to concerns about the intransigence of the Senate, which became a topic 
of public debate during the Presidential campaign of 1943. Roosevelt urged 
a new process for the ratification of international agreements while 
Republican candidate Thomas Dewey defended the status quo of the Senate 
supermajority requirement.48 With Roosevelt's reelection, the House 
Judiciary Committee reported out a potential constitutional amendment, 
requiring majorities in both Houses for the ratification of a treaty.49 The 
amendment was never to be adopted, but when President Truman later 
submitted the Bretton Woods Agreement establishing the International 
Monetary Fund and World Bank to Congress, he did so for majority 
approval by the House and the Senate. 50 As mentioned above, he 
simultaneously submitted the treaty establishing the United Nations Charter 
for approval by Senate supermajority, preserving the possibility that the 
Bretton Woods legislation was an exceptional event justified by the 
pressing need for American leadership in a new global economic order.51 
42. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW§ 303 (AM. LAW INST. 1987). For 
more in-depth commentary on the rise of the congressional-executive agreement, see also 
Hathaway, supra note 6, at 1252-71 (analyzing foreign policy areas where treaties continue to be 
used); John Yoo, Rational Treaties: Article II, Congressional-Executive Agreements, and 
International Bargaining, 97 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 1-11 (2011). 
43. Yoo, supra note 42, at 3; cf Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649, 694 (1892) (addressing the 
constitutionality of an ex ante congressional-executive agreement). 
44. John C. Yoo, Laws as Treaties?: The Constitutionality of Congressional-Executive 
Agreements, 99 MICH. L. REV. 757, 766 (2001). 
45. CONG. RES. SERV., S. PRT. 106-71, TREATIES AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL 
AGREEMENTS: THE ROLE OF THE UNITED STATES SENATE 39 tbl.II-1 (2001). 
46. Id. at 38. 
47. Yoo, supra note 44, at 766-68. 
48. Ackerman & Golove, supra note 6, at 883-85. 
49. Id. at 886. 
50. Id. at 891. 
51. Id. Note, however, that American participation in several important international 
organizations, including the Permanent International Court of Justice and the International Labor 
Organization were concluded as congressional-executive agreements during the interwar years. 
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However, following Bretton Woods, no important trade agreement has ever 
again been submitted solely to the Senate; the General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade (GATT), all of its subsequent amendments, the World 
Trade Organization, NAFT A, and all the free-trade agreements that 
followed it, including the proposed TPP, were all presented to Congress as 
congressional-executive agreements rather than Article II treaties. 52 
The United States' central role in the creation and maintenance of the 
postwar economic order has been thought to justify this sea change. Legal 
academics since the interwar period have rationalized this shift by 
expounding a theory of "interchangeability," which holds that an ordinary 
statute can make any legal change that a treaty could, and, conversely, that a 
treaty can make any change that a statute could.53 On this view, both the 
Article I and Article II routes offer equally legitimate mechanisms of 
international lawmaking, and the choice between them turns on some 
simple Congressional mathematics: whether a Senate supermajority or a 
plain majority of Congress at large provides a more feasible route for 
making any particular international commitments. The constitutionality of 
interchangeability has been defended under a range of different theories, the 
most straightforward being that while the Constitution expressly provides 
for the advice and consent of two-thirds of the Senate, it never rules out that 
a majority in both Houses could simply pass legislation functioning as an 
international agreement. 54 
Interchangeability has its more sophisticated defenders as well. Bruce 
Ackerman and David Golove acknowledge that interchangeability 
represents a departure from the written Constitution, but justify it using 
Ackerman's theory of constitutional change, which focuses on the 
transformative power of "constitutional moments" that are not identical to 
formal Article V amendment processes. 55 On this account, 
interchangeability has been integrated into the Constitution by repeated 
political practice tantamount to its popular ratification, in spite of the failure 
Hathaway, supra note 6, at 1300. 
52. FERGUSSON, supra note 12, at app. A. But see Hathaway, supra note 6, at 1257-58 
(noting that that several minor trade treaties have been concluded recently using the Article II 
mechanism). 
53. E.g., McDougal & Lans, supra note 17, at 206; Yoo, supra note 42, at 768-70 (citing 
McDougal & Lans). For a recent discussion of these sources, see Hathaway, supra note 6, at 
1244-48. 
54. Hathaway, supra note 6, at 1243-48; cf U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10 (expressly prohibiting 
states from entering into international compacts). 
55. See Ackerman & Golove, supra note 6, at 874 (explaining how President Roosevelt 
responded to a strong push by the House of Representatives to pass a constitutional amendment to 
strip the Senate of its "treaty-making monopoly." The President, instead of voicing support for a 
constitutional amendment which would officially give the House treaty-making powers, enacted 
an unofficial policy of entering into international pacts via congressional-executive agreements 
rather than treaties, thereby giving Congress as a whole a power that the Constitution reserves 
solely for the Senate). 
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of a fonnal constitutional amendment to replace the Treaty Clause.56 
Former Bush Administration lawyer John Yoo has defended a more limited 
version of interchangeability: congressional-executive agreements are 
argued to be constitutional for international agreements involving trade and 
domestic regulation-which properly fall to Congress under its Article I 
powers-but not for treaties involving national security and military affairs, 
which lie outside Congress's sole power.57 
Finally, some academics, including Laurence Tribe, reject 
interchangeability as ungrounded in the constitutional text and historical 
practice of constitutional law. 58 As early as 1946, legal observers warned of 
the dangers of consolidating executive power by these means. In the debate 
over the Bretton Woods legislation, Yale Law School Professor Edwin 
Borchard cautioned that, unlike congressional-executive agreements, the 
traditional method for treaty ratification "insures a popular control over 
treaties and . . . safeguards the small states in a manner which an easier 
method of approval might escape. " 59 
Whether or not congressional-executive agreements have 
constitutional legitimacy by dint of any particular textual construction or 
theory of constitutional change, the inclusion of the Treaty Clause reveals 
that the Founders differentiated between treaties and statutes, even if either 
could provide a basis for international lawmaking. Historical practice 
suggests that international legal commitments were mainly secured through 
the Article II treaty ratification process, with the purpose of thwarting 
agreements offering advantages to some regions of the country over 
others.60 Indeed, the Senate supermajority requirement for Article II treaty 
making followed the earlier approach of the Articles of Confederation-
which required nine of thirteen states to ratify a treaty-and which was 
justified as protecting the interests of different states against the binding 
commitments of foreign treaties.61 
The distinction between statutes and treaties turns on the foreign 
interests obviously implicated in the latter. John Jay, writing as Publius in 
Federalist No. 64, argued that treaties could not be undone through nonnal 
legislative processes without risking the credibility of the United States 
56. See id. at 873 (arguing interchangeability triumphed as a result of "war, popular anxiety 
about the peace, and escalating constitutional debate"). 
57. Yoo, supra note 44, at 831. 
58. Tribe, supra note 19, at 1276. 
59. Borchard, supra note 17, at 729. 
60. AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA'S CONSTITUTION: A BIOGRAPHY 189, 191 (2005) 
(discussing how Article II sets forth the requirements for all treaties and noting that prominent 
Federalists cited the supermajoritarian protections of Article II as safeguarding the country from 
the dominance of regional interests); see also Hathaway, supra note 6, at 1281-84 (arguing the 
supermajority requirement prevented the federal government from making treaties that would 
disadvantage a particular region). 
6 l. AMAR, supra note 60, at 190. 
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with its foreign allies.62 While a domestic law is inherently a matter of self-
government, a treaty involves a commitment to a foreign power, thus 
involving both citizens and noncitizens in ongoing obligations given the 
force of law.63 Treaties prove quasi-irreversible for this reason, at least as 
compared to domestic statutes that can be revised by future governmental 
majorities without upsetting foreign relations.64 The corrective to this 
problem, Publius argued, was to trust treaty approval to supermajority 
consent in the Senate: 
States are equally represented in the Senate, and by men the most 
able and the most willing to promote the interests of their 
constituents, they will all have an equal degree of influence in that 
body . . . . [T]he government must be a weak one indeed, if it should 
forget that the good of the whole can only be promoted by advancing 
the good of each of the parts or members which compose the 
whole.65 
Publius' focus was on advancing the interests of each of the parts or 
members that compose the body of the whole. The statement's significance 
especially reflected the different Northern, Southern (and perhaps incipient 
Western) interests at the time-although the Federalists may have believed 
that regional interests would eventually converge. 66 As Akhil Amar 
explains, the Federalists made this and other guarantees to "assure[] 
skeptics that the supermajoritarian safeguards of the Article II treaty process 
would protect regional minorities, thereby implying that in certain 
regionally divisive contexts, a simple federal statute ... would not 
suffice."67 
This guarantee aimed to calm anxieties that had already arisen from a 
regional conflict under the Articles of Confederation. 68 In the 1780s, 
Spanish diplomats entered into negotiations with U.S. statesmen-including 
John Jay-for the American cessation of free navigation of the Mississippi 
River for twenty-five years in exchange for increased trade with Spain.69 
62. THE FEDERALIST No. 64, at 328-29 (John Jay) (Ian Shapiro ed., 2009). 
63. Id. 
64. Id. at 329. 
65. Id. 
66. See id. (dispelling the fear ofmajoritarian oppression of minorities). 
67. AMAR, supra note 60, at 191; see also 3 JONATHAN ELLIOT, ELLIOT'S DEBATES 499-500 
(1986) (recording George Nicholas's and James Madison's discussion of whether the treaty 
provision of Article II would adequately protect the country from dominating regional interests); 2 
MAx FARRAND, FARRAND'S RECORDS 541 (1911) (recording Mr. Gerry's argument that peace 
treaties should require a higher proportion of votes than that required for other treaties). 
68. Charles Warren, The Mississippi River and the Treaty Clause of the Constitution, 2 GEO. 
WASH. L. REV. 271, 293-94 (1934). 
69. AMAR, supra note 60, at 191; see also Warren, supra note 68, at 282-83 (discussing John 
Jay's role in negotiating the treaty with Spain and the proposed twenty-five year cessation of free 
navigation). 
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The treaty would have benefited Northern shipping but harmed states that 
relied on the Mississippi for transportation and trade. 70 The proposal 
provoked an intense and divisive debate, with many Southern statesmen 
indicating a desire to leave the Confederation if the treaty was adopted.71 
Jay abandoned the proposal, and several years later the Mississippi River 
conflict gave birth to the two-thirds "advice and consent" requirement in the 
Treaty Clause.72 Treaties were to be subject to a higher threshold for 
approval, because they could burden sectional interests for so long, with 
little or no chance of amendment or repeal.73 
Alexander Hamilton rearticulated this justification in a later conflict 
over a commercial treaty with Great Britain, the Jay Treaty, which pitted 
him against James Madison. 74 Madison maintained that the treaty had to be 
affirmed by the House as well as the Senate. 75 Hamilton, whose views won 
the day, maintained that the statutes and treaties belonged to 
"distinguishable sp[h]eres of [a]ction."76 Writing to Rufus King, Hamilton 
argued that: 
[I.] The object of the Legislative Power is to prescribe a rule of 
Action for our own Nation which includes foreigners coming among 
us. 
[2.] The object of the Treaty Power is by agreement to settle a rule of 
Action between two Nations binding on both. 
[3.] These objects are essentially different and in a constitutional 
sense cannot interfere. 
[4.] The Treaty Power binding the Will of the nation must within its 
constitutional limits be paramount to the Legislative power which is 
that Will; or at least the last law being a Treaty must repeal an 
antecedent contradictory law.77 
70. AMAR, supra note 60, at 191. 
71. See Warren, supra note 68, at 283-84. 
72. AMAR, supra note 60, at 191-92. 
73. Id. at 191. 
74. See 4 ANNALS OF CONG. 437-38 (1796) (delineating James Madison's expressed views 
on the treaty power). Madison lost this debate. See Jay's Treaty [6 April, 1796], in 16 THE 
PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON 290, 290-301 (J.C.A. Stagg et al. eds., 1989) (recounting how 
Madison's initial proposal was first met with ridicule). But Madison's views apparently 
influenced the self-executing nature of the treaty-it eventually required the House to pass 
appropriations for the treaty to take effect. Id. 
75. See Introductory Note: To George Washington (Mar., 7 1796), in 20 THE PAPERS OF 
ALEXANDER HAMILTON 64, 64-68 (Harold C. Syrett ed., 1974) (noting that Madison's treaty-
amendment proposal failed). 
76. Letter from Alexander Hamilton to Rufas King (Mar., 16 1796), in 20 THE PAPERS OF 
ALEXANDER HAMILTON, supra note 75, at 76, 77 (first alteration in original). 
77. Id. 
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In this justification, we see Publius' concerns in Federalist No. 64 
reiterated: treaties bind the legislative will and cannot easily be overcome 
by later legislation, hence the special entrustrnent to a supermajority in the 
Senate. Hamilton's opponents shared his view of treaties, if not his trust of 
the aristocratic Senate: Jefferson denounced the Jay Treaty as a "conspiracy 
with the enemies of [the] country to chain down the legislature." 78 
An anxiety about what Washington considered entangling "foreign 
influences" persisted throughout the nineteenth century and meant that most 
international lawmaking was enacted through the Treaty Clause of 
Article II.79 It is important to note, however, that the Founders' concern 
about foreign entanglements did not rest on skepticism about the legitimacy 
or efficacy of international law (the "law of nations") but the reverse. It 
was precisely because the Founders wished to maintain the fledgling nation 
as one in good international standing-and took the assumption of 
international legal obligations seriously-that they sought to minimize the 
foreign influence that would come through commercial interconnection. 
Only when the United States gained increased confidence vis-a-vis foreign 
powers in the nineteenth century and later did it shift to using Article I 
commerce powers to make international agreements. A foreshadowing of 
this change came with the congressional declaration in 1871 that the United 
States would no longer treat with the Indian Tribes, considered as sovereign 
nations, but would manage them instead through Article I legislation.so 
What happened to the concern to protect regional interests in the 
enactment of international treaties? In the early twentieth century, distinct 
regional interests were recast as special interests, which were thought not to 
deserve protection in the international lawmaking process. This move was 
justified by new recourse to a conception of a "national interest" that 
transcended regional divides.s1 In economic terms, this transformation 
appears to reflect the post-Civil War dominance of one regional interest at 
the negotiating table: Northern industrial capital, lately transformed into 
finance capital of the East Coast, was newly thought to be able to speak for 
the interests of the nation as a whole, at least regarding its external 
economic affairs. 82 
78. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (Mar. 27, 1796), in 29 THE PAPERS OF 
THOMAS JEFFERSON 51, 51 (Barbara B. Oberg ed., 2002). 
79. For some exceptions involving Texas and Hawaii, see Hathaway, supra note 6, at 1355 
n.352. 
80. Peter J. Spiro, Treaties, Executive Agreements, and Constitutional Method, 79 TEXAS L. 
REV. 961, 995 n.160 (2001). 
81. Cf id. at 972 (discussing scholars who argue that congressional-executive agreements are 
superior because they render it "more difficult for narrow regional interests to defeat an agreement 
otherwise enjoying majority support"). 
82. See PAUL BAIROCH, ECONOMICS AND WORLD HISTORY: MYTHS AND PARADOXES 36-38 
(1993) (discussing various tariff modifications between 1861 and 1914 and arguing that 
protectionism increased during Reconstruction). 
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IL Fast Track and the Autonomy of the Executive 
The shift away from the protection of regional interests in the 
Article II treaty-making process has been further consolidated through a set 
of procedural changes that gave more power to the Executive Branch in 
regulating foreign economic relations. These procedural changes provide a 
"fast track" for expediting trade agreements passed as ex post 
congressional-executive agreements. The modem trade regime has been 
established not just through the use of Article I for international lawmaking, 
but also, since the 1970s, through these fast-track procedures. 
The result has been to increase the autonomy of the Executive Branch 
in international trade negotiations. On the one hand, the use of 
congressional-executive agreements has expanded the number of actors 
involved in giving final approval to international agreements through the 
inclusion of the House of Representatives in the process. This shift has 
been widely and rightly praised as a modernizing move that increases the 
democratic legitimacy of international lawmaking. 83 On the other hand, the 
number of actors able to shape the substance of trade agreements has been 
progressively narrowed through the use of fast-track procedures. The 
Senate once enjoyed the power to consider and amend treaties while 
convened as a deliberative body, constrained by the distinct economic 
interests of the several states and guided by its conception of national 
purpose. Under modem fast-track procedures, a smaller group of policy 
makers-including members of high-profile House and Senate committees 
as well as private sector advisors-shape the treaty while it is under 
negotiation by the Executive Branch.84 The broadening of the final 
approval process since the mid-twentieth century thus contrasts with a 
tightening of control over the formation of the trade agenda since the 1970s 
conceived both in terms of objective setting and textual elaboration. 
This transformation began with the RT AA, which empowered the 
Executive, albeit modestly.85 Under that Act, the President was allowed to 
negotiate tariffs within prespecified ranges to entice reciprocal trade 
liberalization by foreign allies with the assurance of swift congressional 
passage afterward.86 Consequently, Congress merely reviewed the content 
of the agreements negotiated under the RT AA, once they had been formally 
83. See Hathaway, supra note 6, at 1308-37 (discussing how congressional-executive 
agreements make it easier to conclude Article II treaties, create more dependable international 
agreements, and have greater democratic legitimacy because they involve the House in the treaty 
process). 
84. See infra pp. 130-32. 
85. See Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act of 1934, 19 U.S.C. § l35l(a) (1934) (authorizing 
the President to modify duties and alter import restrictions whenever he determined them unduly 
burdensome). 
86. Id. 
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presented, to check for consistency with its authorization. 87 All the relevant 
deliberation took place ex ante, when Congress set the tariff ranges 
specified in the RTAA statute.88 This form of executive delegation does 
not, in our view, represent an undue narrowing of the scope of 
congressional deliberation since the matter to be negotiated upon-a 
reduction in tariff rates-was well defined and thus could be determined 
with precision ex ante. 
However, as trade agreements have grown to encompass behind-the-
border measures, now conceived as non-tariff barriers or trade distortions, 
the domain about which Congress does not deliberate has expanded rather 
than contracted. 89 Permutations of the RT AA had sufficed to lower tariff 
barriers for the following forty years-contributing to the passage of the 
GATT and each subsequent round of tariff liberalization.90 But the Tokyo 
Round of GA TT negotiations, which began in 1973, turned to the regulation 
of an expanded conception of "non-tariff barriers," which no longer 
indicated simply border measures made effective through means other than 
tariffs (e.g., quantitative restrictions or manipulative customs procedures), 
but could be expanded to include almost any regulation that created a so-
called trade distortion, which has ultimately come to include even 
environmental, labor, and consumer-safety provisions.91 
Getting this new round of trade negotiations of such expanded scope 
through Congress looked as though it would prove challenging. During the 
prior Kennedy Round, conflict between President Johnson and Congress 
over conventional non-tariff barriers cast doubt on the willingness of 
Congress to commit to further trade liberalization, particularly if it 
threatened significant domestic impact.92 Specifically, the agreement 
negotiated by Johnson would have required the United States to eliminate 
the "American Selling Price" method of pricing goods at the border as well 
as to change U.S. antidumping practices.93 Although Congress instructed 
87. See id. § 1354 (requiring the President merely to seek information and advice from the 
United States Tariff Commission and various departments before concluding a foreign trade 
agreement). 
88. See id. § 1351 (prohibiting presidential changes in existing tariffs that exceeded a 50% 
increase or decrease, but giving the President broad discretion within this limit to modify tariffs). 
89. See ANDREW LANG, WORLD TRADE LAW AFTER NEOLIBERALISM: RE-IMAGINING THE 
GLOBAL ECONOMIC ORDER 223-40 (2011) (describing the expanding scope of application of 
GATT/WTO and its impact on domestic regulation). 
90. Hal Shapiro & Lael Brainard, Fast Track Trade Promotion Authority, BROOKINGS 
(Dec. 2001 ), http://www.brookings.edu/research/papers/2001/12/globaleconomics-brainard 
[https://perma.cc/K8LD-ZAQ6]. 
91. LANG, supra note 89, at 224-26. 
92. Koh, supra note 23, at 146. 
93. FERGUSSON, supra note 12, at 4, 4n.9 (citing l.M. DESTLER, RENEWING FAST-TRACK 
LEGISLATION 6 (1997)). 
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Johnson not to accept the agreement, he did so anyway.94 Congress then 
refused to adopt the changes regulating non-tariff barriers.95 In response, 
and in anticipation of the Tokyo Round's conclusion, the Trade Act of 1974 
created the first modem fast-track procedure, both restricting and redefining 
who could influence international trade agreements during the negotiating 
phase, especially on the question of non-tariffbarriers.96 
The Act expressly provided for commitments on both tariffs and non-
tariff barriers to be passed with time-limited debate and no possibility of 
either amendment or filibuster by simple majorities in both houses of 
Congress-that is, on the fast track.97 Permutations of the 1974 Act 
establishing fast track have been renewed periodically since, with the result 
that-subject to an initial delegation of authority to the President-
Congress restricts itself to an up or down, simple-majority vote on whatever 
trade deals are negotiated, a favored treatment not otherwise provided for in 
other areas of lawmaking.98 In this respect, trade has avoided the general 
trend of increasing party-political polarization both owing to the use of fast-
track procedures and the cross-party consensus that these procedures both 
issued from and helped to consolidate. 
Although fast-track has broadened the numbers involved in the final 
approval of trade agreements, it has limited who controls objective setting 
and textual elaboration during the actual negotiations. Specifically, the 
1974 Act limited Congress's at-large consideration of any negotiated trade 
agreement to ninety days after a proposal by the Executive.99 In its place, it 
empowered several congressional committees-notably, the Senate Finance 
Committee and the House Ways and Means Committee-to influence the 
negotiating process. 100 It also required consultation during the negotiations 
with a newly created "Industry Trade Advisory Committee" of private 
sector advisors to ensure representation of a wide range of economic 
interests (and to mobilize elite pressure useful for later congressional 
approval). 101 Importantly, although the 1974 Act allowed the fast-tracking 
of proposals concerning both tariffs and non-tariff barriers, it specifically 
exempted regulatory commitments in areas of "consumer protection, 
employee health and safety, labor standards, or environmental standards," 
which required the passage of special bills authorizing negotiations and 




97. Id. at 5. 
98. Id. at 5-8. 
99. Trade Act of 1974, 19 U.S.C. § 2112(e) (2012). 
100. See id.§ 2112(b)(4)(A)(ii). 
101. Id. § 2155. 
102. Trade Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-618, § 102(b)-(c), 88 Stat. 1978 (codified as amended 
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was to preserve a role for ordinary congressional deliberation concerning 
regulations within its traditional remit: fast-tracking a customs-house 
procedure was a different matter than fast-tracking a change to an 
environmental or labor regulation, even if both were arguably "non-tariff 
barriers." 
In 1988, the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act took another 
step toward limiting who could influence trade negotiations before final 
approval. That Act eliminated the 1974 Act's distinction between tariff and 
non-tariff barriers, and with it, some of the special considerations for trade 
measures impacting consumer protection, employee health and safety, labor 
standards, and environmental standards. 103 All trade barriers were now 
procedurally and conceptually in the same boat, including all domestic 
regulations that could be argued to distort international trade, even if not 
intended as trade barriers. 104 
These two developments-the invention of fast track and the extension 
of trade discipline into domestic regulation-have together constituted a 
radical change, already enabled but not necessitated by the background shift 
from Article II treaty making to Article I congressional-executive 
agreements. Congress at large now has limited access to the negotiating 
positions and draft texts of treaties while they are under development by the 
Executive Branch. 105 And it then has only a short time to consider 
complicated agreements that may impact domestic policies once the 
Executive releases them. 106 The result is that a narrow slice of Congress 
and elite, private-sector advisors have an outsized influence on a 
negotiation process that now goes far beyond trade as traditionally 
understood. 
A further development of the past decade has been the use of national 
security classification to further limit access to the negotiating drafts prior 
to their formal presentation.107 Using national security classification allows 
the United States Trade Representative (USTR) to control the circulation of 
at 19 U.S.C. § 2112 (2012)). 
103. Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, 19 U.S.C. § 2901 (2012). 
104. See, e.g., LANG, supra note 89, at 170 (noting that interpretive evaluation must be used 
to determine what regulations "constitute[] a trade barrier"). 
105. See, e.g., Elizabeth Warren, U.S. Senator, Address to the Senate (May 21, 2015), 
http://www.realclearpolitics.com/video/2015/05/21/warren_trade_deal_secret_because_if_details 
_ were_made_public_now _the_public_ would_oppose_it.html [https://perma.cc/C7U4-PY 46] 
(discussing the lack of access to information about the Trans-Pacific Partnership provided by the 
Executive Branch to Congress and the public). 
106. Id. 
107. For a detailed discussion on the implications of the exemption for national security 
information found in the Freedom of Information Act on the Trans-Pacific Partnership and other 
international negotiations, see David S. Levine, Bring in the Nerds: Secrecy, National Security, 
and the Creation of International Intellectual Property Law, 30 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 105, 
126-40 (2012). 
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negotiating drafts, further limiting the extent of congressional oversight, in 
keeping with a general trend toward reduced transparency in international 
economic lawmaking. 108 More broadly, the effect of national security 
classification-which, in the case of the TPP (like other recent agreements), 
extends to the negotiating positions of the USTR for four years after either 
the passage or failure of the legislation-is not only to restrict the number 
of those in Congress involved in objective setting or textual elaboration for 
new agreements, but also to reduce popular mobilization against trade 
agreements during the negotiating process. 109 Interest-group mobilization 
in favor of the trade agreements can generally be generated through the 
Industry Trade Advisory Committee (IT AC) members, who can report back 
to their constituencies and employers in broad terms on the progress of the 
negotiations. 110 But otherwise-diffuse social movement pressure cannot be 
brought to bear on the small number of congressional committees that count 
when the details of trade negotiations are so closely controlled and the 
actual laws are only made available to the public once they are ready to be 
fast-tracked. The justification for this new regime of secrecy is that it 
provides the Executive with room for maneuver in several distinct respects, 
but this must of course be set against the impact it has on broader traditions 
of self-government, particularly given that the trade regime now goes far 
beyond simple tariff policy. It is in this context that the Wikileaks 
dissemination of draft chapters of the TPP became important in generating 
alternative mechanisms of public accountability and academic scrutiny, 
even though the dissemination of these drafts was a direct contravention of 
the new national security regime for trade law. 111 
Some fast-track defenders claim these developments have enhanced, 
rather than undermined, executive accountability by giving at least select 
members of Congress more access to the negotiations. 112 But this argument 
neglects the question of who gets to influence the content of a treaty during 
108. Oona Hathaway & Amy Kapczynski, Going It Alone: The Anti-Counterfeiting Trade 
Agreement as a Sole Executive Agreement, ASIL INSIGHTS (Aug. 24, 2011), 
https://www.asil.org/insights/volume/15/issue/23/going-it-alone-anti-counterfeiting-trade 
-agreement-sole-executive (https://perma.cc/7GHN-UWUT] (describing the exceptional secrecy 
shrouding the negotiations for this Agreement, which excluded even Congress). 
109. See, e.g., Levine, supra note 107, at 128-29 (suggesting that the public "deserves an 
explanation" for this "level of secrecy"). 
110. See generally Margot E. Kaminiski, Opinion, Don't Keep Trans-Pacific Partnership 
Talks Secret, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 14, 2015), http://www.nytirnes.com/2015/04/14/opinion/dont 
-keep-trade-talks-secret.htrnl?_r=O [https://perma.cc/7JKC-87A7]. For examples of exchanges 
between the USTR and the IT A Cs, see William New, Confidential USTR Emails Show Close 
Industry Involvement in TPP Negotiations, lNTELL. PROP. WATCH (May 6, 2015), http://www.ip 
-watch.org/2015/06/05/confidential-ustr-emails-show-close-industry-invol vement-in-tpp-
negotiations/ [https://perma.cc/N2GU-6D3U]. 
111. Warren, supra note 105. 
112. Koh, supra note 23, at 159-61. Koh acknowledges that fast-track enhances presidential 
leverage over Congress and suggests several corrective amendments. Id. at 169-80. 
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the negotiation phase. It focuses instead on the increase in the number of 
congressional representatives involved in the expedited final approval of a 
treaty, rather than the decrease in the number of those involved in objective 
setting and textual elaboration. 
It also misses the increasing role for private lobbyists representing elite 
economic interests in the negotiating process. For example, during the 
negotiation of the TPP, only a few members of Congress could access 
proposed drafts of the treaty, which were classified as a national security 
matter by the USTR. 113 By contrast, all members of the IT AC, which 
included an outsized proportion of pharmaceutical companies and banks, 
had access to draft text of the treaty while under negotiation by the 
USTR. 114 This means that the White House could have released the treaty 
text only in giving an implementing bill to Congress, which would only 
have 90 ninety days to digest complex draft legislation. In fact, the Obama 
administration released the treaty text before introducing an implementing 
bill, apparently to defend and build support for the unpopular proposal. 115 
Moreover, given fast-track procedures, Congress can only vote up or down 
without amendment on a proposal which was years under negotiation-and 
thus would risk endangering the possibility of any agreement whatsoever 
through the expression of concern about the final text negotiated by the 
Executive. By contrast, industry advocates had years to analyze and 
influence negotiations while they occurred, without incurring public 
scrutiny in doing so. 116 
The exclusion of Congress at large from the fast-tracked negotiation 
process contrasts with the role reserved for the Senate in the early Republic 
under the Treaty Clause. Recall Jay's emphasis on the need for deliberative 
prowess in his justification of senatorial "advice and consent": issues of 
foreign "war, peace, and commerce" were especially complex and could 
"only be approached and achieved by measures which not only talents, but 
also exact information, and often much time, are necessary to concert and to 
113. See, e.g., Warren, supra note 105 (discussing how even the members of Congress given 
access to proposed drafts of the Trans-Pacific Partnership were given limited access and forced to 
keep it secret from the public). 
114. See Christopher Ingraham & Howard Schneider, Industry Voices Dominate the Trade 
Advisory System, WASH. POST (Feb. 27, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp 
-srv/special/business/trade-advisory-committees/ [https://perma.cc/5FXW-LBBF] (showing the 
makeup of the Obama Administration's trade advisory system). See generally Margot E. 
Kaminski, The Capture of International Intellectual Property Law Through the US. Trade 
Regime, 87 S. CAL. L. REV. 977 (2014) (discussing the effects of a captured USTR on the 
international intellectual property regime). 
115. At the time of this writing, no implementing bill has been introduced. The Obama 
administration released the TPP text on November 25, 2016. 
116. See Kaminski, supra note 114, at 981 ("The text of trade negotiating proposals and drafts 
of free trade agreements are kept secret from most stakeholders, including the public and the 
press."). 
1514 Texas Law Review [Vol. 94:1495 
execute."117 Because senators were selected by an elite-in those days, by 
state senators and not popular vote-and had a much longer term than 
representatives, they were expected to have the capacity and the time to 
engage in lengthy, careful consideration of foreign affairs. 118 The Senate's 
wisdom supplemented the President's-though, as Oona Hathaway and 
others have observed, the Advice and Consent Clause was quickly reduced 
to the "consent" clause given political dynamics in the early republic. 119 
This did not imply that the Senate was understood as another 
negotiator at the treaty table. In the same essay, Jay admits that 
negotiations will require "secrecy and immediate despatch [sic]" when 
treaty partners needed to entrust intelligence to the President. 120 But early 
practice suggests that secrecy about both the negotiation process and the 
resultant deals, even when justified, was still limited to the duration of the 
official negotiations, as illustrated in the debates over the Jay Treaty. 
Madison, who opposed the treaty, worked with Edward Livingston in the 
House to call for the release of Jay's correspondence with President 
Washington and his other diplomatic papers so that the House could 
evaluate the constitutionality of the proposed treaty. 121 The papers were 
released, vindicating both the House's and Senate's demand for further 
information.122 During that episode and thereafter, the Senate claimed a 
right to amend any treaty proposed by the President. 123 
The practice during the Founding Era was thus dramatically different 
from what now prevails. To summarize: the Senate lost its special place in 
the deliberative process with the shift from Article II to Article I 
international lawmaking. But given fast-track procedures, Congress as a 
whole did not then replace the Senate to serve as a comparable deliberative 
partner for the Executive. Congressional deliberation in the new trade 
regime is limited to ratification of ex post congressional-executive 
agreements that are shaped mainly by the Executive Branch. The 
interchangeability of Article II treaty making and Article I legislation, in 
conjunction with fast-track, has thus functioned to consolidate executive 
control over trade even as the number of congressional representatives 
involved in ratifying the results of executive negotiation has expanded. The 
consequence has been to favor executive preferences in trade deals: as 
Aaron-Andrew Brohl has concluded in a positive political theory analysis, a 
two-thirds voting rule with amendments tends to result in outcomes much 
117. THE FEDERALIST No. 64, supra note 62, at 325-26. 
118. Id. at 326-27. 
119. Hathaway, supra note 6, at 1308. 
120. THE FEDERALIST NO. 64, supra note 62, at 327 (emphasis omitted). 
121. Madison in the Fourth Congress, 7 December 1795-3 March 1797: Editorial Note, in 16 
THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON, supra note 74, at 141, 141-59. 
122. Id. 
123. Id. 
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nearer the Senate's policy preferences than a one-half voting rule without 
amendments. 124 Even holding the voting rule constant at one-half, the 
elimination of amendments, combined with the President's role as the first-
mover in the legislation, results in outcomes markedly closer to the 
President's policy preferences. 125 This is especially true given the Senate's 
historical practice of proposing amendments to treaties during the 
ratification process itself. 126 As Bruhl summarizes, "fast track makes the 
president a proposal-maker who, by setting policy ... can appropriate to 
himself all of the benefits from changing the status quo ... [i]t is a 
qualitative reversal of roles."127 
Moreover, the President's preferences over trade have themselves 
become intertwined with those of the lobbyists included at the negotiating 
table. The Trade Act of 1974 sought to combine the efficiency of 
congressional-executive agreements with new input from select 
congressional committees and private advisors, thereby enhancing the 
Executive's room for maneuver in international negotiations-but in so 
doing, it simultaneously empowered industry representatives in the 
negotiating process. 128 It is unsurprising to note that these private advisors 
have disproportionately represented economic interests that benefited from 
the postwar economic order they helped to consolidate and expand, with 
heavy participation during the TPP negotiations by the finance, 
pharmaceuticals, and telecommunications sectors. 129 The protection offered 
by the Treaty Clause to regional and sectional interests in the early republic 
has been lost, but it is not obvious that a unified national interest has 
replaced it, given that special economic interests now have a privileged role 
in the negotiating process. 
III. From Governance of Trade to Governance through Trade 
As mentioned briefly above, not only have the procedures by which 
international commercial agreements are made changed dramatically since 
the Founding Era, but the content of the agreements has changed as well. 
International trade commitments increasingly impinge on areas once 
regulated through normal congressional statutes. That changes are being 
made to domestic law through international agreements does not, of course, 
124. Aaron-Andrew P. Bruhl, Using Statutes to Set Legislative Rules: Entrenchment, 
Separation of Powers, and the Rules of Proceedings Clause, 19 J.L. & POL. 345, 399-400 (2003). 
125. Id. at 397-404. 
126. Id. at 403-04 & n.19 (citing Kevin C. Kennedy, Conditional Approval of Treaties by the 
U.S. Senate, 19 LOY. L.A. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 89, 91 (1996)). 
127. Id. at 401. 
128. See Koh, supra note 23, at 165 (recognizing that the President can consult with "private 
industry groups" as part of the negotiation process). 
129. See Ingraham & Schneider, supra note 114 (showing the industries represented by the 
committees of the executive trade advisory system). 
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flout the Constitution. Under the Constitution, Congress can implement 
any law whose commitments fall within the scope of its powers, including 
the power to regulate both interstate and international commerce. 130 The 
question is not whether Congress has the constitutional authority to approve 
domestic legal changes through international law, but whether it is wise to 
allow the Executive to formulate, in collaboration with foreign powers, an 
agenda for domestic law effectuated through trade agreements and then 
presented for streamlined congressional approval. In other words, it is the 
increasing power of the Executive to set objectives and draft textual 
commitments for international coordination in areas of traditional 
congressional purview that should give us pause, especially given that 
international compacts may bind future governments more durably than 
normal statutes. 
Here again, attitudes and practices in the early republic differed from 
those of today. The early republic's most famous opponent of international 
commercial entanglements was George Washington, whose Farewell 
Address of 1796 counseled for merely ''temporary" commitments in 
international commerce. 131 Washington feared any more permanent 
commitments and denounced the "foreign influence" they introduced into 
U.S. politics as "one of the most baneful foes ofrepublican government."132 
In fact, in Washington's own administration, the President could only 
discretionarily restrict trade. 133 Congress authorized Washington to lay an 
embargo on the ships and vessels of foreign nations whenever he deemed 
"the public safety shall so require."134 John Adams and Thomas Jefferson 
enjoyed similar powers. 135 
Jefferson was perhaps the most ardent supporter of Washington's anti-
entanglement position. Indeed, he argued on grounds of self-government 
that no treaty ought to be self-executing.136 Instead, every treaty should be 
implemented through a separate congressional statute, which need not adopt 
the treaty precisely as negotiated by the Executive. 137 Jefferson argued this 
130. Ackerman & Golove, supra note 6, at 811. 
131. George Washington, President of the United States, Farewell Address (1796), 
http://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/washing.asp [http://penna.cc/8VT3-FXAB]. 
132. Id. 
133. Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649, 683-85 (1892). 
134. Id. at 683-84. 
135. Id. at 684-85. 
136. AMAR, supra note 60, at 304. Madison held a less extreme version of this view, where 
laws passed by both houses would always trump treaties ratified by the Senate in case of a 
conflict. Id. at 307 n.44. 
137. Id. at 304-05. 
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position during a debate over an 1815 commercial treaty with Britain, 
which, among other things, committed the United States to equal treatment 
of British shipping vessels in American ports. 138 Writing in the Washington 
Daily National Intelligencer, Jefferson claimed: 
[T]he present enterprise of the Senate [is] to wrest from the H. of 
Representatives the power, given them by the constitution, of 
participating with the Senate in the establishment & continuance of 
laws on specified subjects. [T]heir aim is, by associating an Indian 
chief, or foreign government in form of a treaty to possess 
themselves of the power of repealing laws become obnoxious to 
them, without the assent of the 3d branch, altho' that assent was 
k . 1 139 necessary to ma e 1t a aw. 
For Jefferson, shipping policy fell within the responsibility and powers 
of the House of Representatives, which ought to have the final say on the 
matter, negotiated treaty or not. With the exception of Madison, Jefferson 
did not win over many of his contemporaries to this view. 140 But his 
attitude epitomizes a general wariness about foreign entanglement that 
arguably persisted throughout much of the nineteenth century, when the 
Executive's discretion over trade was mostly limited to resumption of trade 
relations following military conflict, 141 and even down to the twentieth-
century defeat of Wilsonian internationalism. 142 
This wariness no longer holds. Far from regarding treaties as 
potentially entrapping instruments, they are now· considered largely 
interchangeable with statutes, with an additional priority given to 
international commercial deals through the use of fast track. The 
combination of interchangeability plus fast track creates a new incentive 
structure for getting legal changes made domestically, not just 
internationally. If desired domestic policies can be made effective as part 
of an international bargain with foreign allies, they can be fast tracked into 
an agreement, which may prove harder to reverse than ordinary legislation. 
138. See A Convention to Regulate the Commerce Between the Territories of the United 
States and of His Britannick Majesty art. 1, July 3, 1815, 8 Stat. 228; Letter from Thomas 
Jefferson to James Madison (Mar. 23, 1815), in 8 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON: 
RETIREMENT SERIES 371, 373 (Barbara B. Oberg & J. Jefferson Looney eds., 2008) (arguing that 
the "[c]onvention should be a separate act"). 
139. Thomas Jefferson, "A" (Thomas Jefferson) to the Washington Daily National 
Intelligencer, WASH. DAILY NAT'L INTELLIGENCER (Mar. 13, 1816), reprinted in 9 THE PAPERS 
OF THOMAS JEFFERSON: RETIREMENT SERIES, supra note 138, at 548, 548. 
140. AMAR, supra note 60, at 306--07 (demonstrating that the Founding Federalists disagreed 
about the relationship between congressional statutes and treaties). 
141. See Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649, 684-90 (1892) (recounting delegations to the President 
of the resumption of trade relations in the nineteenth century following their suspension for 
military or geopolitical reasons). 
142. See Charles A. Kupchan & Peter L. Trubowitz, Dead Center: The Demise of Liberal 
Internationalism in the United States, INT'L SECURITY, Fall 2007, at 7, 11 (recounting the Senate's 
rejection of the League ofNations, which Woodrow Wilson had embraced). 
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The desire to be seen as a member of the international community in good 
standing can deter nations from derogating from agreements which have 
broad acceptance. Furthermore, international regulatory regimes create 
network effects over time; the more common a standard becomes, the more 
entrenched, and the greater costs associated with switching from it. 143 
The modern trend of packaging regulatory regimes within trade 
agreements began with the 1962 Kennedy Round of GATT negotiations. 144 
Having reached single-digit tariff rates across most classes of industrial 
goods during previous negotiating rounds, 145 the GATT parties now sought 
to eliminate non-tariff barriers-paradigmatic border controls that imposed 
heightened costs on foreign goods, but later expanded beyond this original 
conception. 146 
As discussed above, when the Tokyo Round of GATT negotiations 
concluded in 1979 with an agreement covering government procurement, 
product standards, customs regulations, and antidumping procedures, 
Congress had a new fast-track procedure in place to pass these provisions 
quickly. 147 The 1988 Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act, under 
which both NAFT A and the WTO were established, eliminated the 
remaining legislative distinction between tariff and non-tariff barriers, 
reflecting the conclusion of a long conceptual transformation. 148 
Today's trade agreements dig yet deeper into areas of domestic 
regulatory concern. For example, the TPP contains chapters regulating 
labor rights, intellectual property, Internet policy, financial regulations, 
environmental measures, and much else that goes far beyond the traditional 
concern with market access. 149 Perhaps most controversially, it will further 
embed the use of investment arbitration, which has in the past targeted 
environmental impact assessment regimes in Canada, 150 tobacco-labeling 
143. See DAVID SINGH GREWAL, NETWORK POWER: THE SOCIAL DYNAMICS OF 
GLOBALIZATION 9, 48 (2008) 
144. LANG, supra note 89, at 222-40 (describing the Kennedy and Tokyo rounds of GATT 
negotiations as part ofa neoliberal tum in international trade law). 
145. Id. at 219-40. 
146. For the restricted understanding of non-tariff barriers, see General Agreement on Tariffs 
and Trade art. XI, Apr. 15, 1994, 4 U.N.T.S. 190. 
147. See supra text accompanying note 91 (discussing the Tokyo round of GATT 
negotiations). 
148. Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, 19 U.S.C. § 2901 (2012). 
149. See generally OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, TRANS-PACIFIC 
P ARTNERSmP · (2016), https://ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements/trans-pacific 
-partnership/tpp-full-text [https://perma.cc/EE5L-VCXV]. 
150. See Clayton v. Canada (United States v. Canada), Case No. 2009-04, Award on 
Jurisdiction and Liability, at 176-79, 200-15 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 2015), http://www.italaw.com/sites/ 
default/files/case-documents/italaw42 l 2.pdf [https://perma.cc/33Y2-CXLL] (imposing an award 
against the government of Canada, in part, for not properly applying Canadian law in conducting 
an evaluation of the environmental impact of a project and for the JRP's report in breach of 
Articles 1102 and 1105 ofNAFTA). 
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laws in Australia, 151 and, recently, even President Barack Obama's decision 
to veto the Keystone XL pipeline project. 152 As the trade agenda morphs 
from a concern over tariff rates into these "next generation" issues, the 
question of how trade deals are concluded becomes even more 
consequential. 
Defenders of the modem trade regime could argue that the use of 
congressional-executive agreements has remedied Jefferson's complaint 
about the Treaty Clause favoring the few over the many. By bypassing the 
Treaty Clause, the modem congressional-executive agreement prevents the 
Senate from using the treaty power to usurp the power to regulate interstate 
commerce, which is properly a power of Congress at large. 153 But this line 
of argument misunderstands the procedures governing the current trade 
regime-and perhaps also Jefferson's original complaint. As Bruhl argues, 
by giving the Executive and foreign officials a first-mover advantage in the 
legislative process, the fast-track process shifts outcomes away from where 
they would be if Congress as a whole maintained control. 154 When the 
President presents a negotiated trade agreement, often years in the making, 
as a take-it-or-leave-it proposition to Congress, the agreement need only 
satisfy congressional preferences minimally greater than the status quo to 
pass. On the other hand, when Congress can originate and amend 
legislation on its own, something closer to the reverse is true: it must only 
craft legislation that satisfies the Executive's minimum preferences to avoid 
a veto. 
Thus, today's process for passing trade agreements does not answer 
Jefferson's original concern but may rather deepen it. For the nub of 
Jefferson's complaint was that the Senate and the Executive were using the 
treaty process to accomplish what they could not have done through normal 
congressional processes: they misused the "form of a treaty to possess 
themselves of the power of repealing laws become obnoxious to them, 
without the assent of the 3d branch, al tho' that assent was necessary to 
make it a law."155 Arguably, this is what fast track does today, in spite of 
151. See Tobacco Plain Packaging-Investor-State Arbitration, AUSTRALIAN Gov.: ATT'Y 
GEN. 'S DEP'T (Dec. l, 2011), http://www.ag.gov.au/tobaccoplainpackaging [https://perma.cc/ 
4YT6-CEGL] (discussing arbitration regarding Philip Morris Asia's argument that Australia's 
tobacco-packaging measure breached the Hong Kong Agreement). 
152. Ian Austen, TransCanada Seeks $15 Billion in Damages from U.S. Over Keystone XL 
Pipeline, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 7, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/0l/07/business/intemational/ 
transcanada-to-sue-us-for-blocking-keystone-xl-pipeline.htrnl [https://perma.cc/U2KL-FC9E]; see 
also Cory Adkins & David Singh Grewal, Democracy and Legitimacy in Investor-State 
Arbitration, YALE L.J. F. (forthcoming 2016) (comparing two controversial investor-state 
disputes, the Keystone XL litigation and a recent award against Canada for an environmental 
assessment). 
153. See Bruhl, supra note 124, at 397-98 (suggesting this defense). 
154. Id. at 347-48. 
155. Jefferson, supra note 139, at 548. 
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the shift from Article II treaty making to Article I congressional-executive 
agreements: it empowers the Executive to use an international compact to 
secure binding legal commitments, including over domestic regulations of 
great consequence that might not otherwise pass through normal 
congressional procedures. Indeed, one consequence of fast track is that 
international commercial agreements may be sought not so much for the 
opening they provide to foreign markets, but for the reconfiguration of 
domestic regulatory regimes that could not be accomplished under normal 
(i.e., non-fast track) procedures in Congress. The result, as one of us has 
put it, is that international trade agreements are now concerned not so much 
with governance of trade, but with governance through trade, both at the 
national and global level. 156 Jefferson's alternative-the use of 
implementing legislation for every treaty-would have given Congress 
much more latitude in deciding whether and how to turn negotiated 
international commitments into binding domestic obligations. 157 
IV. The Constitutional Political Economy of International Trade Law 
Throughout this Essay we have focused on the differences between the 
current regime for regulating the international commerce of the United 
States, which involves the use of fast-tracked congressional-executive 
agreements, and its predecessor, which began in the Founding Era and 
continued through to the twentieth century, and centered on the Treaty 
Clause. One puzzling aspect of this dramatic shift is that the discourse 
about treaties and trade has been, in some respects, continuous. Advocates 
of the earlier regime emphasized America's need to preserve its freedom by 
zealously defending national sovereignty. George Washington established 
the paradigm in his famous farewell address, where he warned against 
foreign entanglements: 
Against the insidious wiles of foreign influence (I conjure you to 
believe me, fellow-citizens) the jealousy of a free people ought to be 
constantly awake, since history and experience prove that foreign 
influence is one of the most baneful foes of republican 
government. 158 
Washington went on to counsel the management of foreign commerce 
according to rules that were "but temporary, and liable to be from time to 
time abandoned or varied, as experience and circumstances shall 
156. See Grewal, supra note 13. 
157. This would have come at the cost, of course, of the Executive's credibility in 
international negotiations, but this cost must be weighed against other factors, including the 
preservation of a republican form of constitution in circumstances of globalization. See infra 
notes 174-76 and accompanying text. 
158. Washington, supra note 131. 
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dictate"159 -in other words, according to rules not permanently entrenched 
by treaty. Washington feared attachments to European powers that might 
force, or seduce, the United States to act against its freedom. Like most 
republican theorists, he put the preservation of collective autonomy ahead 
of the economic benefits that trade might bring, and, like all revolutionary 
Americans, he was deeply suspicious of the commercial allure of 
international empire, having just extricated the United States from British 
control. 160 
Prompted by these same concerns, American foreign policy in the 
early nineteenth century-notably through the Louisiana Purchase and 
military incursions in the Caribbean, and Central and South America-
sought to establish a geographic domain in which the United States could 
control a foreign commerce independent of the European empires. As Jed 
Rubenfeld has suggested, "the central purpose of the Monroe Doctrine ... 
remained the same goal that lay behind Washington's 'isolationism': to 
preserve U.S. supremacy in its own sphere of action and particularly to 
preserve U.S. freedom of action vis-a-vis the European powers."161 During 
the same period, the United States maintained high import tariffs on 
industrial goods to the benefit of its infant industries, in line with policies 
inaugurated soon after the Revolution. 162 
The substance of U.S. trade relations shifted away from the 
protectionism of the nineteenth century to international economic liberalism 
in the twentieth, but may be considered continuous if judged in terms of the 
purpose of preserving national autonomy. Recall Roosevelt's admonition 
as he sought the passage of the Reciprocal Trade Agreement Act of 1934 
that "[i]f the American government is not in a position to make fair offers 
for fair opportunities, its trade will be superseded."163 Roosevelt's point 
was that failure to liberalize would ultimately put the United States in a 
vulnerable position: it would lose commerce to other nations and have its 
influence thereby limited. 164 This shift tracked the transformation of the 
159. Id. 
160. For a contemporary interpretation of republican political theory in light of modem 
globalization, see Cecile Laborde & Miriam Ronzoni, What Is a Free State? Republican 
Internationalism and Globalisation, POL. STUD. ONLINEFIRST, Dec. 11, 2015, at l (arguing "that 
the forms of unchecked power that globalisation (if left untamed) sets off create new opportunities 
for the domination of state-by other states as well as by non-states actors" (emphasis omitted)). 
161. Jed Rubenfeld, Unilateralism and Constitutionalism, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1971, 1979 
(2004). 
162. BAIROCH, supra note 82, at 52-55. 
163. Franklin D. Roosevelt, President of the United States, Message to Congress Requesting 
Authority Regarding Foreign Trade (Mar. 2, 1934), in 3 THE PUBLIC PAPERS AND ADDRESSES OF 
FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT 113, 114 (Samuel I. Rosenman ed.). 
164. Id. at 114. This is a version of a longer running argument that Istvan Hont has called 
"jealousy of trade." See generally, ISTVAN HONT, THE JEALOUSY OF TRADE: INTERNATIONAL 
COMPETITION AND THE NATION-STATE IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE (2005). 
1522 Texas Law Review [Vol. 94:1495 
United States from a former colony wary of entanglement in empire to a 
position of global leadership in the postwar GATT and Bretton Woods 
down to the "Washington Consensus"165 of the 1980s and 19908. 
The justifications for this new approach to world affairs have been 
little altered since the interwar period. Barack Obama, in seeking passage 
of the TPP, has employed rhetoric nearly identical in its import to 
Roosevelt's: 
When more than 95 percent of our potential customers live outside 
our borders, we can't let countries like China write the rules of the 
global economy. We should write those rules, opening new markets 
to American products while setting high standards for protecting 
workers and preserving our environment. 166 
Like Roosevelt, Obama claims that unless America pursues liberalization 
on its own terms, it will lose commerce-and therefore its freedom-to 
foreign nations. 
The goals of U.S. foreign policy have thus remained constant even 
while their application to world trade has shifted with U.S. commercial 
interests. 167 The dominant narrative concerning this shift portrays it as not 
only an adaptation to changing world conditions but also as a form of 
national consolidation: the modernization of antiquated constitutional and 
governmental processes in order to transcend sectional conflict. 168 The 
dimension of constitutional political economy has, however, been largely 
missing from this analysis. 
We suggest that the history of changing trade procedures is part of a 
larger story concerning the gradual subordination of the post-Civil War 
agrarian South and Midwest to Northeastern industrial capital and, more 
recently, of the laggard U.S. manufacturing sector to the financial sector 
over the last few decades. It is beyond the scope of this Essay to trace the 
historical origins and import of these conflicts. It suffices to note that 
different regions of the country have historically had different economic 
modes of production; hence, a conflict among economic interests will be 
realized in political terms as a regional conflict. The use of ex post 
congressional-executive agreements to conclude trade deals thus had the 
165. See GREWAL, supra note 143 at 236, 250--51 (2008) (stating that "it was the unrivaled 
power of the United States" that transformed the GATT into the WTO, and describing the 
"Washington Consensus"). 
166. Barack Obama, President of the United States, Statement by the President on the Trans-
Pacific Partnership (Oct. 5, 2015), in BRIEFING ROOM: WHITE HOUSE, https://www.whitehouse 
.gov/the-press-office/2015/ l 0/05/ statement-president-trans-pacific-partnership [https://perma.cc/ 
5XCN-6T76]. 
167. See ROBERT D. BLACKWILL & JENNIFER M. HARRIS, w AR BY OTHER MEANS: 
GEOECONOMICS AND STATECRAFT 152-78 (2016) (considering the changing history of U.S. trade 
policy as a function of the changing place of U.S. geoeconomic strategy). 
168. Hathaway, supra note 6, at 1312-16. 
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effect of repudiating an earlier principle of regional vetoes on foreign 
commitments, which had found force in the Senate supermajority 
requirement. The more recent advent of fast track for passing these trade 
agreements has further shifted control of economic policy-both over 
international commerce and, to an increasing extent, domestic economic 
regulation-to the Executive Branch while empowering representatives 
from populous coastal states and multinational enterprises that can be 
competitive on the global stage. Consolidating this general shift has been, 
even more recently, the use of national security classification to control the 
circulation of negotiating drafts, further limiting general congressional and 
popular oversight. 169 
Together, these changes reflect a modernization of trade procedure but 
not necessarily its democratization, as advocates have tended to claim. 170 It 
is true that the Senate supermajority requirement empowers a minority of 
senators to block legislation that might be in the national interest, and we do 
not suggest a return to Article II treaty making. But we do wish to call 
attention to the difference among several aspects of the determination of the 
trade agenda: objective setting in negotiations, textual elaboration of 
international commitments, and final approval of concluded agreements 
and to note that while the modem fast-track regime broadens the number of 
representatives involved in final approval, by contrast with Article II treaty 
making, it also restricts the number involved in setting broad objectives and 
elaborating the textual details of the proposed commitments. Furthermore, 
with trade increasingly considered a national security issue, the number of 
those involved in giving substance to trade agreements has become smaller 
still. 
The decisive shift came not with the rise of ex post congressional-
executive agreements but with the use of fast-track procedures to give them 
special priority over normal Article I legislation. The rise of fast track 
coincided with the extension of the trade agenda beyond traditional 
concerns with market access, to address the management of non-tariff 
barriers and related regulatory issues. It is perhaps unsurprising that the 
tum to fast track came in the early 1970s at what is now identified as the 
major inflection point in the evolution of the postwar global economy. The 
1970s saw the end of the "economic miracle," sometimes described as the 
169. See Levine, supra note 107, at 107-08 (discussing the practice of classifying information 
related to trade agreements to prevent oversight). 
170. See, e.g., Ackerman & Golove, supra note 6, at 804 (defending the constitutionality of 
NAFTA); Hathaway, supra note 6, at 1308-37 (defending congressional-executive procedures); 
Koh, supra note 23, at 144 (defending fast-track). We maintain that the rise of congressional-
executive agreements, while itself not antidemocratic, paved the way for fast-tracking trade 
agreements. While Article I congressional-executive agreements incorporate more 
representatives and are in that sense more democratic than Article II treaties, the use of fast-track 
procedures dramatically narrows the range of representatives who can make substantive ex ante 
contributions to international lawmaking. 
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"thirty glorious years" ( 1945-197 5), characterized by an exceptional period 
of both high and widely shared economic growth, which had not been seen 
before and has not been seen since. 171 Against this backdrop, the immediate 
postwar consensus on trade was faltering in the United States and 
elsewhere, especially as trade deals began taking in more than tariffs but 
impacting areas of domestic regulatory purview. While the tum to Article I 
for international lawmaking may have reflected a new and broadly shared 
sense that international law was too important to be controlled by Senate 
supennajority rules, the tum to fast track was driven not by a new 
consensus on international lawmaking, but by an emerging disagreement 
over trade liberalization and regulatory harmonization. With the end of the 
exceptional postwar period, international trade deals increasingly lacked 
popular legitimacy and could only be passed through special procedures not 
accorded normal Article I lawmaking, but in line with an elite consensus on 
the relevant trade priorities for the United States that belied what was 
otherwise an era of party-political polarization. 
This tighter control over the determination of the trade agenda matters 
all the more because of a gradual shift in the nature of international trade 
law over the last few decades. In earlier decades, congressional-executive 
agreements on trade consisted of the ex ante specification of acceptable 
tariff ranges by Congress, which limited the range of possible trade 
"agendas" that the President could negotiate. But with the shift to "behind 
the border" measures addressing an expanded (and conceptually 
underdetermined) set of non-tariff barriers, the power to set the agenda for 
new trade agreements has grown into a more general power to influence 
domestic regulations considered as impacting trade. Moreover, this new 
form of governance is given not increased scrutiny but expedited passage, 
heralding what might be called "government by fast track" for any issue 
that can be linked to trade promotion. 172 
What does this new trade regime augur for a constitutional political 
economy of the kind Fishkin and Forbath wish to recover? They argue that 
the present United States is moving toward oligarchy and losing the 
171. Thomas Piketty has reinvigorated the discussion about the relation of this period to 
present times. See THOMAS PIKEITY, CAPITAL IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 96-99 (Arthur 
Goldhammer trans., 2013) (stating that "when viewed in historical perspective, the thirty postwar 
years were the exceptional period," and comparing postwar growth with that of other eras); see 
also David Singh Grewal, The Laws of Capitalism, 128 HARV. L. REV. 626 (2014) (reviewing 
PIKETTY, supra) (analyzing Piketty's argument and considering its legal implications). 
172. While congressional-executive agreements may produce more reliable international 
commitments because their domestic enforcement is less in doubt than treaty enforcement, they 
are now being used to produce behind-the-border legal regimes with the full force of domestic 
law. Hathaway, supra note 6, at 1316. These legal rules are not produced through normal 
legislative processes. They are therefore inconsistent with Jefferson's stance that international 
agreements with great effect on the domestic legal order should be confirmed independently by 
Congress operating in its normal capacity. 
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republican character of its earlier eras. 173 As we have suggested above, the 
shift to "government by fast track" is by no means an obvious gain in 
democratic self-government, especially given the inclusion of special 
interest lobbies as an explicit part of the agenda-setting process, now 
sequestered behind a national security classification. In fact, even the move 
away from a sectional veto of the kind that the Article II treaty-making 
process instituted may not be an obvious gain for an inclusive "democracy 
of opportunity" ideal, although we do not see a return to decision making 
by Senate supermajority as a panacea. The ideal of a sectional veto has 
been rather comprehensively discredited since the abolition of slavery, 
preserved for so long by regional interests. 174 Yet the notion that distinct 
interests-perhaps based on occupational status or other considerations that 
may partly track geography-should have a say in trade negotiations may 
deserve reconsideration. Certainly, any concern with inequality and 
deprivation today needs to reckon with the entrenched locational 
determinants of poverty and inequality, which recent research has 
suggested, unsurprisingly, is intimately tied to the dynamics of international 
economic competition. 175 Addressing these concerns about the effects of 
international trade should not require a reversion to Senate supermajority 
rules for treaty making, but should call into question the use of fast-track 
procedures to avoid ordinary congressional deliberation, amendment 
powers, and procedural protections. 
Perhaps, most significantly, while the twentieth-century trade regime 
proved continuous with that of earlier centuries in working to preserve U.S. 
autonomy (albeit through liberalization rather than protection, given 
America's role in the twentieth-century world economy) more recent 
changes in the substance of proposed trade agreements portend a shift in 
even this fundamental orientation. The controversial use of investor-state 
arbitration, as well as the extensive cross-border regulatory harmonization 
in proposed free trade agreements, may undermine national sovereignty 
rather than buttress it. 176 If these changes are generalized and deepened, 
they could portend the most momentous shift yet in the nature of the U.S. 
trade regime, delivering a form of cross-border harmonization that would 
work to undermine rather than buttress democratic sovereignty. 177 Such a 
173. FISHKIN & FORBATH, supra note 5 (manuscript at 1). 
174. As Oona Hathaway summarizes: "it was [previously] seen as a way to keep the federal 
government from bargaining away regional interests." Hathaway, supra note 6, at 1278. 
175. David H. Autor et al., The China Shock: Learning from Labor Market Adjustment to 
Large Changes in Trade 1-4 (Nat'! Bureau of Econ. Res., Working Paper No. 21906, 2016). 
176. See LANG, supra note 89, at 314--53; Jose E. Alvarez, Contemporary Foreign Investment 
Law: An "Empire of Law" or the "Law of Empire"?, 60 ALA. L. REV. 943, 975 (2009) 
(discussing a potential danger in the international investment regime). 
177. See LANG, supra note 89, at 314--53; Alvarez, supra note 176, at 975. 
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regime would have been totally unacceptable to "the jealousy of a free 
people" as understood in the Founding Era and probably also to those 
twentieth-century innovators who pioneered the procedures for international 
lawmaking that could make this new regime possible. Any project for a 
new constitutional political economy of the kind Fishkin and Forbath 
propose will have to contend centrally with the changing face of 
international commerce in the American republic of the twenty-first 
century. 
